Staggered wage setting is introduced in a dynamic general-equilibrium monetary model, and the issue of superneutrality of money is addressed. This paper demonstrates that, in an optimizing framework, a mild permanent change in the rate of growth of money could have substantial effects on the steady-state aggregate level of output and welfare. Previous works fail to reproduce these results because they consider restrictively simple utility and production functions. The model exhibits high costs of inflation and provides a rationale for the pursuit of price stability observed in western countries. Therefore, in the presence of staggered adjustment, superneutrality of money proves to be a key issue, which should be taken into account in any economic model with staggered adjustment.
INTRODUCTION
Staggered wage/price-setting models have been used widely in the literature to assess the impact of disinflationary policies [see Ball (1994) and references therein]. However, quite surprisingly, very little has been said about the influence of the rate of growth of money on long-run output and welfare. We build a generalequilibrium monetary model and we then address the issue of superneutrality of money in the steady state when there is staggered wage/price setting.
Previous log-linear staggered wage/price models already acknowledged that money could be nonsuperneutral. Yet, this issue was supposed to be a minor one. The reason is that, in naive log-linear staggering models, money growth rates can affect steady-state output only if the intertemporal rate of discount is different from zero. Consider, for example, the model of Calvo (1983b) . The key equation is the wage/price-setting rule
where x(t) is the wage/price set on contracts renewed, p(t) is the average price level, y(t) is the level of output, δ is the parameter governing the Poisson process of wage/price changes, and r is the intertemporal rate of discount. Calvo (1983a,b) , sets r to zero. According to Calvo (1983b, p. 238 n. 5 
) the reason for this is
With a non zero real interest rate, [(1)] could also naturally incorporate a factor to reflect it. This addition would, however, make steady states (in the ensuing analyses) sensitive to permanent changes in the rate of devaluation or expansion of money supply. Without denying the existence, and maybe importance, of such effects, we will stick to form [(1)] for the sake of simplicity. See also Phelps (1978) and Taylor (1979 Taylor ( , 1980 for a similar procedure.
If r = 0, then steady-state output would not depend on the rate of growth of money supply. However, in his standard textbook log-linear presentation [e.g., Blanchard and Fischer (1989) ], Calvo's (1983a,b) model has been used to study the effects of a disinflation, but we are left with the question of why the policymaker wants to disinflate, given that money is superneutral and that there are short-run costs of disinflating.
The same question becomes even more puzzling if r = 0 (as usually supposed in economic models). In this case, in fact, steady-state output is an ever-increasing function of the rate of growth of money. Romer (1990, p. 208 n. 5 ) provides a clear intuitive explanation for this result:
[I]f the real interest rate is positive, higher trend inflation increases mean output (given [δ] ). The source of this effect is that trend inflation causes the expected profitmaximising price to be rising over time and that a positive real interest rate causes firms to put relatively greater weight on current rather than future optimal prices; thus they charge less than the weighted average expected profit-maximising price.
A positive r , then, by decreasing x, lowers the average level of prices and hence raises the level of output. However, it is evident that a level of output ever-increasing in the rate of money growth is not a very desirable feature of a model built with the purpose of studying disinflation. Given that, and also because the effect of the intertemporal rate of discount is supposed empirically to be rather small, the original simplifying, but unjustified, assumption r = 0 has become an established and natural one in log-linear staggered wage/price adjustment models.
In contrast, in dynamic general-equilibrium monetary models, there is always a strong reason to disinflate, because a positive rate of inflation forces agents to economize on real balances. Indeed, this is exactly what happens in the more complete version of Calvo's (1983a) model, in which the model is embedded in a utility-maximizing framework. However, Calvo (1983a) assumes the existence of a costless "price-regulation mechanism" to ensure that each consumer pays the same whatever the firm at which she realizes her purchases. Although this hypothesis permits a very neat and elegant analysis of the short-run dynamics, it deletes all of the interesting effects caused by the interrelation of different firms charging different prices. However, as this paper shows, these interrelations are precisely the source of strong nonsuperneutrality effects. Once the price-regulation-mechanism hypothesis is made, from the point of view of the effects of the rate of growth of money on the steady state, the model is exactly equivalent to a flexible-price model. Indeed, steady-state output is independent of the rate of growth of money, and the Friedman rule turns out to be optimal, because it satiates the demand for real-money balances.
1 In Calvo (1983a) , the welfare costs of a positive rate of inflation, therefore, are just the cost of the inflation tax on real-money balances. An estimate of this cost is provided by Cooley and Hansen (1989) . They build a general-equilibrium, cash-in-advance monetary model with flexible prices and estimate the cost of the inflation tax of a 10% rate of inflation to be around 0.4% of the GNP.
In a recent paper, Ireland (1995) analyzes disinflationary monetary policies in a general-equilibrium monetary model with staggered prices. His model exhibits staggered price-setting decisions and explicitly takes into account that different firms charge different prices. It turns out that the optimal monetary policy faces a trade-off between the zero inflation tax and productive efficiency. In fact, on one hand, the Friedman rule requires a negative rate of growth of the money supply, whereas, on the other hand, productive efficiency requires holding the money supply fixed. The optimal monetary policy would balance these two effects, hence determining a negative rate of inflation, but bigger than the one necessary for zero inflation tax.
2 However, the model of Ireland (1995) implies only very mild effects of the rate of growth of money on steady-state output and welfare, the order of magnitude being similar to the one of Cooley and Hansen (1989) . As shown below, the explanation of this result lies in the simplified structure of Ireland's (1995) model in which both the production function and the utility function are linear in labor; moreover, the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods equals one. As a conclusion, neither Calvo's (1983a) model, with the price-regulationmechanism hypothesis, nor Ireland's (1995) model is able to catch the importance of nonsuperneutrality in a staggered wage/price model.
We build a dynamic general-equilibrium model with staggered wage-setting behavior, and we study the properties of the steady state with respect to changes in the rate of growth of money. The model is similar to that of Ireland (1995) , but has three distinct features. First, it enables us to explicitly demonstrate the role of the intertemporal discount factor in the wage-setting process and to show the same effect explained above by Romer (1990) . Second, the model is more articulated in that it allows for more general utility and production functions. In particular, it introduces the usual nonlinearities in technology and preferences: decreasing return to scale to labor, increasing marginal disutility of labor, and elasticity of substitution among goods bigger than one.
3 These nonlinearities prove to be the channel through which the rate of growth of money strongly affects the steady-state output and welfare. Third, the model exhibits staggered wages instead of prices, as advocated by Ireland (1995) . 4 Hence, it provides a rationale for the price-stabilityoriented policies observed in western countries. We do observe staggered wagesetting behavior, we do observe a relatively low inflation rate in western countries, and, notwithstanding high unemployment, the latter are still seeking price stability.
We demonstrate that, in the presence of staggered wage setting, an inflation rate of the magnitude recently registered in developed economies (5%) can cause very high costs both in output and in welfare, giving strong support to the pursuit of price stability. The same argument would be much more difficult to sustain in a model with nominal rigidities in the form of fixed staggered price, because this feature, unlike fixed staggered wages, is not observed in modern western economies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is presented. In Section 3, it is shown that money is not superneutral in the steady state. In Section 4, some simple numerical examples suggest that varying the steady-state money growth rate could have a strong impact on steady-state output and welfare. Therefore, in the presence of staggered adjustment, superneutrality of money turns out to be a very important, rather than a minor, issue.
MODEL
The model introduces staggered wage settingà la Taylor (1979) in the framework presented by Rankin (1998) . The economy consists of a continuum of industries indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and of a continuum of industry-specific household unions.
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Every industry produces a single differentiated perishable product and the goods market in each industry is Walrasian. The household union has monopoly power in the labor market, because labor is not allowed to move across industries. Preferences are CES over consumption goods and these are gross substitutes. All firms have the same technology, and households have the same preferences. There is no uncertainty in the model, and agents perfectly foresee the future. The symmetry of the economy is broken by the introduction of staggered wages. The economy is divided into two sectors of equal size: industries i ∈ [0, 1 2 ] and industry-specific household unions j ∈ [0, 1 2 ] comprise sector A, whereas industries i ∈ (
, 1] and industry-specific household unions j ∈ (
, 1] comprise sector B. In each sector, nominal wages are negotiated every two periods and they are fixed and equal within the two periods. Then, staggering is introduced by assuming that sector A fixes the wages in even periods, and sector B fixes them in odd periods.
Demands for Output and Labor in the Two Sectors
All of the household unions have the same utility function,
where 0 < β < 1. A consumption index c t is defined by the CES function
where the elasticity of substitution, θ , is bigger than 1. Real-money balances, m t , enter the utility function because of the liquidity services that money provides.
Here, m t = M t / p t represents the real balances held at the end of period t. The last term in the utility function, l t , is the quantity of labor supplied by the household during period t. The CES preferences give rise to the standard demand functions for good i,
where p t is the price index defined as
, and E jt is total goods expenditure. As a consequence, the maximized subutility c jt is equal to E jt / p t . Firms are price takers in both the goods and the labor markets and they all have the following production function:
The nominal wage is fixed by the monopolistic household unions, before firms choose employment. Thus, firms maximize profits, given the nominal wage X it . The demands for labor and the output are, respectively,
When choosing the wage, the union realizes that its behavior influences the price of the output i, and therefore the demand for labor. Given the total demand for industry i, simply by imposing the equilibrium condition on the goods market, c it = y it , the following relation between the labor demand and the nominal wage is found:
This is the demand function faced by the monopoly union in industry i and it exhibits a constant money-wage elasticity. K t is parametric to the union because aggregate expenditure and the price index are considered as given by the union, since industry i has measure zero in the economy as a whole.
Because, in equilibrium, all industries of the same sector produce the same level of output and charge the same price, we can easily aggregate within the two sectors. Supposing sector A fixes the wage in period t, (t + 2), (t + 4) . . . and sector B fixes the wage in period (t − 1), (t + 1), (t + 3) . . ., 6 the output levels of the two sectors in period t are, respectively,
In equilibrium, the aggregate nominal output is equal to the aggregate nominal expenditure on consumption,
The demands for the output of the two sectors in period t are
where, in equilibrium,
Intertemporal Behavior of Household Union
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In each period, the household chooses the level of consumption, the quantities of money and bonds that she will transfer to next period, and the supply of labor together with the level of money wage. Each household enters period t with a predetermined level of real-money balances m t−1 and of real wealth a t−1 , defined as
Households therefore are permitted to trade bonds. During period t, each household receives a lump-sum transfer t t , the gross interest on bonds, the wage income, and profits distributed by the firms π t . The real budget constraint therefore is given by
Because the nominal wage is fixed for two periods, at the beginning of period t, the household unions decide the nominal wage to be charged in t and in t + 1. After two periods, the problem faced by the households is the same. Therefore, the intertemporal problem should be defined over two periods. Deriving the first-order conditions and rearranging, we obtain
The first condition is a standard-consumption Euler equation for the optimal intertemporal consumption choice. The second and third conditions equate the marginal utility of real balances to the marginal consumption opportunity cost of holding money. The fourth yields the optimal wage charged by the monopoly household union. This is given by a fixed markup [ε/(ε − 1)] over the quantity in the square bracket. The latter is a ratio between sorts of average values of the disutility from labor and of the utility from consumption over the two periods, that is, an average between the optimal flexible wages of the two periods. These average values are weighted by the discount factor β and by the coefficient K . Note that, because β < 1, the variables of the second period are discounted. Hence, they are given a lower weight in calculating the average value. This is exactly the source of the Calvo-Romer effect, described in the introduction.
To find an explicit solution of the model, the following particular form of the utility function is assumed 9 :
where e > 1. This is a partially logarithmic utility function that exhibits increasing marginal disutility of labor. The first-order conditions now are given by
To define the steady state of the model, an aggregation problem must be solved. By construction of price and consumption indexes, p t c At = E At , p t c Bt = E Bt , and
Nonetheless, what is missing is a relation between the aggregate nominal expenditure E t and the nominal expenditure of each sector. In fact, expenditure on consumption depends on wealth, that is, on the path of all future incomes and not only on present ones. However, households can exchange bonds between each other. They therefore can insure each other against fluctuations in consumption levels. This implies that the marginal utility of consumption will be the same across households in each period. Hence, given the separable specification of the utility function, they will consume the same in each period. That is, the consumption of sector A is the same as consumption of sector B in every period.
10 Thus, imposing c At
, it is straightforward to solve for the steady state.
STEADY-STATE ANALYSIS
In a steady state, the money supply is growing at the constant rate of (1/µ) − 1, where µ is defined as (M t /M t+1 ) . Unsurprisingly, the money wage X t and the aggregate price level p t are found to grow through time at the same rate as the money supply. The steady state is characterized by the following expressions 11 :
Because X t is growing over time, the sector that sets X t will exhibit a higher money wage than the sector that has already set the money wage, X t−1 , in period (t − 1). In every period, therefore, there will be two different money wages in the economy, and so, two different prices. The symmetry between sectors' behavior is evident from Table 1 . 
If money grows at a positive rate, then µ < 1. The steady-state behavior of each sector is characterized by a slump in the period in which the wage is set, followed by a boom in the next period, when the other sector fixes the wage. More precisely, y At = y Bt−1 = y slump and y At+1 = y Bt = y boom . Therefore, each sector exhibits the boom in the period in which the other sector fixes its money wage.
The ratio between the slump and the boom in each sector is given by (y At / y At+1 ) = (y Bt−1 /y Bt ) = µ σ ε . Intuitively, two effects come into play. First, since the money wage is fixed for two successive periods, it is a kind of average of the optimal one. As a result, it is higher than the optimal one in the first period and lower in the second period. The same is true for prices. The second effect derives from the interrelation between relative prices and demand. Because there are two sectors charging different prices, the composition of demand would change as the ratio of the prices in the two sectors changes. Thus, the amplitude of the cycle depends not only on σ , but also on θ . In fact, ε is an increasing function of θ : the bigger the elasticity of substitution, the larger the size of the cycle. In the period in which sector A fixes the money wage, sector B is still locked in the one fixed a period before. As a consequence, sector A exhibits not only a higher money wage, but also a higher real wage (and price) than sector B. This has two negative effects on the output of sector A. The first one is for supply reasons because the real wage is higher than the optimal one. The second one acts through demand, given that the price of sector B is lower and the goods are imperfect substitutes.
12 Note that these effects, because of the assumption of the price-regulation mechanism, are ignored in Calvo's (1983a) model. Moreover, they are partially present in Ireland's (1995) model, but their potential importance is simply choked down at the very outset, by putting, a priori, σ = e = θ = 1 and canceling the nonlinearities.
Sector prices are growing over time, but the rate of growth is different, depending on whether the sector money wage has changed. Besides, the aggregate price index p t is growing at the same rate as the money supply.
Households are paid a higher wage, but they work less in a slump than in a boom. They receive less income in a slump than in a boom. More precisely, (l A t X t /l B t X t−1 ) = µ ε−1 < 1; therefore, the difference between income levels also is an increasing function of θ. However, with regard to welfare, since households of both sectors enjoy the same level of consumption and real-money balances, it follows immediately that households are better off in a slump simply because they work less [(l 
Real aggregate output, therefore, is constant over time, but it depends on µ, that is, money is not superneutral in steady state. If µ = 1, then y ss = y n . In the case of a constant money supply, in fact, staggering has no effect, because nominal wages and all of the nominal variables are constant over time. Therefore, there would be complete symmetry between the two sectors that produce the same level of output and charge the same price. In a steady state, the economy would behave as a flexible-wage economy.
The derivative of y ss with respect to µ can be demonstrated to be nonpositive for µ = 1, and the condition β > µ eε+ρ is sufficient for (dy ss /dµ) to be nonnegative. This implies that y ss reaches a maximum at a point µ * ∈ (0, 1) such that β σ +(1−σ )θ σ +θ(e−σ ) ≤ µ * ≤ 1. Hence, to maximize the level of steady-state output, the system requires a positive level of inflation.
13 This is, however, only due to a positive intertemporal rate of discount. If the latter is equal to zero, then β = 1, and y ss is maximized for µ = 1. The reason for this result is exactly the same as explained by Romer (1990) .
Nevertheless, unlike Calvo's model, y ss is not ever-increasing in the rate of growth of money and then it is obvious that there are other effects coming into play. The intuition is straightforward given the zigzag behavior of sectors' output in steady state. Because of the nonlinearities characterizing the production and utility functions, households generally would prefer to produce the same amount of output in each period. A rate of inflation different from zero and the staggered adjustment structure, instead, impose a cycle on sectors' output. The bigger the cycle, on average, the worse off are the households and the lower is the output. These nonlinearity effects add to the intertemporal rate-of-discount effect and actually dominate it, making y ss decline as the rate of inflation grows.
Suppose that θ = 0 and e = σ = 1. Then,
and only the intertemporal rate-of-discount effect is present here.
14 As Figure 1A shows, y ss is ever-increasing in the rate of growth of money (rgm in the graphs), and the lower β, the bigger is this effect. Intuitively, if θ = 0, the goods are no longer gross substitutes and each sector just receives half of the real demand. The output of the sectors is just the same in every period. This case corresponds to Calvo's (1983a) model. If θ is close to 1, then, as Figure 1B shows, the effect of β is still present, but there is also a weak effect resulting from the substitution among different goods. The latter effect eventually would overtake the former one as the rate of money growth rises. This case corresponds to Ireland's (1995) model. Figure 1C shows the behavior of y ss for what can be considered plausible values of the parameters. 15 As easily can be seen, the nonlinearity effects make the curve bend. The maximum still occurs at a positive rate of growth of money (because β < 1), but then the curve bends very quickly as the money growth rate increases. Moreover, note that our model reproduces the empirical negative correlation between inflation rates and employment rates reported by Cooley and Hansen (1989, Sec. III.C) .
The welfare level in the aggregate is a function of µ. 16 In particular, welfare tends to infinity as µ tends to 1/β. As a result, in this model the optimal money rule also corresponds to the Friedman rule. In this case, real-money balances, and thus welfare, tend to infinity and the model is undetermined. Figures 2A and 2B show the behavior of welfare in Ireland's (1995) case (e = σ = 1, θ close to 1) and in the base case, respectively. In the first case, welfare is decreasing in the money growth rate simply because real balances are decreasing as the latter rises. Output does not change very much, because the intertemporal rate of discount is small, and so, the real-balances effect dominates. In the second case, instead, the nonlinearity effects clearly dominate. Further to the left in Figure 2B , welfare starts to increase and tends to infinity as rgm approaches β − 1 = −0.05 (off the graph). Our utility function, chosen for tractability and simplicity reasons, does not imply a satiation point for real balances. However, this is highly unrealistic. We can suppose the existence of a satiation point, simply assuming that for all m greater than some m * , the term (ln m t ) in the utility function will be replaced by a constant k. 17 If k is not unrealistically high, then the effects on the real part of the utility function would dominate. 18 In Figure 2B then, welfare would be maximized at rgm = −0.45%.
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As the graphs show, staggered wage setting calls for price stability because it gives rise to high cost of inflation.
HOW BIG ARE THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN MONEY GROWTH ?
In this section some numerical examples are presented to give an insight into how big the effects of nonlinearities can be. 20 What has been computed is how the steady state of the system changes, when the steady-state rate of money growth goes from 5% to zero. The results are summarized in Table 2 . Y gives the percentage change in aggregate output; W gives the change in welfare. This is measured in consumption-equivalent gain, that is, how much consumption must be given to the households to make them enjoy the same level of welfare as in the case of zero money growth. 21 Just from a quick look at the table, it is immediately evident that a wide range of possibilities arises. In particular, the results depend heavily on the values of the nonlinearity parameters θ, σ , and e. Because the amplitude of the sectors' output cycle is [1/(1 + rgm)] σ ε , the bigger θ and σ , the bigger is the amplitude of the cycle and the more the curve bends. In the base case in which σ = 1, e = 4.5, and θ = 6, then a change from 5% to 0 in the rate of money growth leads to a change in steady-state output of 3.41%. The change in welfare is equal to 8.44% increase in consumption. The variation in welfare due only to the changes in consumption and labor levels is equivalent to 6.96% gain in consumption; the rest of the gain is due to the change in real balances. These numbers are somewhat impressive, given that 5% money growth is very moderate inflation consistent with the experience of most western countries. In the absence of nonlinearities, as in Ireland's (1995) model, there is actually a loss in output, because only the intertemporal rate-of-discount effect is present. This is, however, somewhat negligible (−0.032). Nonetheless, the gain in welfare is equal to 1.24% of consumption, but this is entirely due to the rise in real balances. In fact, the variation in welfare due only to a change in output and labor levels is equal to a loss of −0.066%.
In the extreme case in which θ = 20, e = 10, and σ = 1, the change in output amounts to 36.05% and the one in welfare to 88.70% equivalent variation in consumption. 22 The equivalent variation in consumption due only to the variation of output and labour levels amounts to 85.1% of the initial consumption level. In this case, the effects are therefore of enormous magnitude.
The results are very sensitive to all of the nonlinearity parameters and especially to σ . If σ is low then, the effects are reduced greatly, though still of some importance. Intuitively, σ = 1 corresponds to the maximum degree of nominal rigidity. In this case, in fact, each sector can afford to satisfy all of the received demand without changing its price. If instead σ < 1, then the higher the output produced by the sector, the higher is the price to be charged because of the diminishing returns to labor. This fact obviously reduces the gap between the prices of the two sectors and therefore their output gap in each period.
Figures 3A-C show very neatly how the curve bends more as the nonlinearity parameters increase. 
CONCLUSIONS
The numerical results suggest that, in staggered adjustment models, superneutrality is far from being the minor issue that has been thought so far. This paper actually demonstrates that it very well can be the case that a mild permanent change in the rate of growth of money could have substantial effects on aggregate output and welfare. Previous models with staggered wage/price behavior fail to acknowledge this fact. In the steady state, Calvo's (1983a) model behaves as a flexible price model, because of the peculiar hypothesis of a price-regulation mechanism. Ireland's (1995) model is too simple in its structure to detect strong effects of the rate of growth of money on the steady-state output and welfare. In particular, because of the linearity in the production and utility functions in labor and the elasticity of substitution among goods equal to one, Ireland's (1995) model does not capture the effects due to the usual nonlinearities in technology and preferences: decreasing return to scale to labor, increasing marginal disutility of labor, and elasticity of substitution among goods bigger than one. Once these effects are taken into account, it turns out that staggered wage-setting behavior induces strong nonsuperneutrality properties and high costs of inflation. Hence, superneutrality should be a key issue if staggering is out there in the economy and should be taken into account in any economic model with staggered adjustment. Moreover, given that staggered wages are observed in western countries, we can easily explain high costs of inflation and provide a rationale for the pursuit of price stability in western countries.
NOTES
1. It is probably worthy to recall that, in Calvo (1983a) , leisure does not enter the utility function and the labor supply is exogenous.
2. In a model with these features, the reason why the policymaker wants to disinflate is immediately evident. However, the long-run gains have to be compared with the short-run costs of disinflating, because of the staggered price-setting structure. Therefore, Ireland (1995) analyzes the very interesting issue of the optimal disinflationary path, that is, how monetary policy can disinflate optimally, balancing the short-run costs and the long-run gains. See Ascari and Rankin (1997) for the effects of disinflations in the model presented in this paper.
3. When we use the expression "usual nonlinearities in utility and production functions," we mean precisely the three points just mentioned.
4. " Cho and Cooley (1992) find that nominal wage setting models do a better job than nominal price setting models in matching a variety of correlations that appear in the data. While their work indicates that it would be useful to consider the nature of optimal monetary policy in economies with wage rigidities as well as price rigidities, this is left as a task for future research" [Ireland (1995 [Ireland ( , p. 1432 ].
5. A continuum of industries means that no imperfectly competitive agent is large relative to the economy as a whole.
6. In other words, at the beginning of period t, sector A signs a new contract and fixes the nominal wage X t for the two subsequent periods. At the same time, sector B is locked in the contract that it signed one period before, that is, X t−1 . At the beginning of period t + 1, then, sector B signs a new contract X t+1 for the next two periods, whereas X t remains valid for sector A, and so on. Therefore X t , X t+2 , X t+4 , . . . are the nominal wages fixed by sector A, whereas X t−1 , X t+1 , X t+3 , . . . are the ones fixed by sector B.
7. In what follows, index j is suppressed to lighten notation. 8. To avoid confusion, it is probably worth noting that A t and M t both refer to end-of-period definition, but a t and m t are not defined conformably. The former, in fact, is deflated by p t+1 and the latter by p t .
9. Rankin (1998) and many others in the literature (see references therein) use a similar utility function.
10. I thank Giuseppe Bertola for suggesting this argument. 11. y n = α( ε ε−1 de δσ ) −σ/e is the steady-state output in the flexible wage version of this model, and ρ = 1 − ε.
12. Envision this economy without staggering, that is, household unions fix the money wage for two periods, but they all reset it in the same period. Then, its behavior would be characterized by a rather artificial oscillation in aggregate output between boom and slump. In fact, given the complete symmetry of the economy, only this first effect would be present, and the ratio of output between the boom and the slump would be equal to µ σ . Now, the second effect enlarges the amplitude of the sector's output cycle.
13. This is quite a strong result by itself. There is a widespread belief that a little bit of inflation is good for the economy, and if commentators look at GDP to judge what is good and what is bad for the economy, then the model would justify this belief. To our knowledge, only Dazinger (1988) gets a similar result in a dynamic general-equilibrium model, but looking at welfare and not at output. Other % = exp W (0) − W (5%) δ − 1 * 100.
22. Given what has been discussed in note 15 about the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply and given that θ = 20 has been used in the literature for this kind of numerical examples [e.g., Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) ], this case is actually not as extreme as might seem.
23. What is actually plotted on the vertical axis is the ratio (y ss /y n ), which is the ratio between the aggregate output in the staggering model and the one in the flexible wage version of the same model. That is why the Figure 3A is decreasing in sigma. The aggregate output (y ss ) is actually increasing in sigma (asy n ), but the higher sigma, the higher is the effect described in the paper and the lower is the ratio between y ss and y n .
